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Abstract
In response to changes in the domestic and international 
situations around the victory of the anti-Japanese war, the 
Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) adjusted their established strategic deployments 
in due course to cope with the new post-war domestic 
political and military landscapes. In face of civil war, 
dictatorship and secession threats, the CPC Central 
Committee proposed the policy of “peace, democracy 
and unity”, which was widely recognized by all classes of 
society. By signing the “October 10th Agreement” during 
the Chongqing Negotiations, the KMT and the CPC 
validated the policy of “peace, democracy and unity” and 
the approach to democracy proceduralization as the basic 
principles and direction of China’s post-war development.
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1. DISPUTE OVER THE SURRENDER-
ACCEPTING RIGHT AND CHOICE OF THE KMT 
AND THE CPC FOR A PEACE OR WAR POLICY
As Japan announced its unconditional surrender on 
August 15, 1945, the Chinese people’s war against Japan 
ended up with victory. Along with the victory, the most 
important, urgent and real political issue facing the KMT 
and the CPC was how to distribute the right to accept 
surrender. The dispute between the KMT and the CPC 
over the right to accept surrender was not just a military 
issue, but a political one as well, which would involve the 
move direction of the post-war China and fundamental 
changes in domestic political landscape.
Chiang Kai-shek gave orders to He Yingqin at the 
midnight: externally to issue an ultimatum to the highest 
commander of Japanese army, demanding a response with 
24 hours to such surrender conditions as ceasing military 
operations, maintaining public order, protecting public 
and private properties, and deferring to KMT troops; 
while internally requiring the KMT troops to follow 
five orders, namely actively occupying “key points and 
important lines in enemy rear”, using camouflaged troops 
to “control key points and important lines after Japanese 
retreat to wait for the arrival of KMT troops”, and “being 
prepared for war”, with special emphasis on each war 
zone “to warn enemy troops under their jurisdiction not to 
surrender or surrender their weapons to anyone other than 
the military commanders that I have designated.” 1
Faced with the grave situation of military oppression 
and political strangulation by the KMT authorities, Zhu 
De, the commander in chief of the CPC army, sent a 
telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on the August 16th, pointing 
out that it was totally wrong for Chiang Kai-shek to 
order the Eighteenth Group Army to “stay in place and 
stand by”. Zhu De also made a formal proposal as to the 
distribution of the surrender-accepting right between 
the KMT and the CPC. However, the CPC’s protests, 
complaints and suggestions did not receive any positive 
response from the KMT authorities and U.S. government.
1 Instructions on Precautions to be Taken on the Surrender of 
Japanese Troops in Each War Zone (No.62). President Chiang Kai-
shek’s Archives - A Brief Sketch of Events (2011, pp.68-69). (Taiwan) 
National History Museum.
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Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the CPC, gave his 
instructions that the CPC should “oppose resolutely, 
d i s a p p r o v e  o f  a n d  p r e v e n t  a  c i v i l  w a r ”  ( T h e 
Documentation Research Office of the CPC Central 
Committee,  1993, p.65),  and consider resuming 
negotiations between the KMT and the CPC to resolve 
possible armed conflicts or even civil war. At the same 
time, the CPC should suspend criticism against the KMT 
and U.S government to ease relations between the KMT 
and the CPC. Zhou Enlai instructed that the Chongqing 
Working Committee should vigorously promote the 
CPC’s basic policies, including “opposing civil war and 
dictatorship, while advocating peace and democracy” 
(The Documentation Research Office of the CPC Central 
Committee, 1998, p.629), to win support from the 
domestic mass and especially the democratic forces, and 
should work together to contain the threat of a possible 
large-scale civil war. As a result, the Chongqing Working 
Committee published a series of editorials in Xinhua 
Daily, pointing out that the fruits of victory in the war 
against Japan should belong to the people and that one-
party dictatorship and secret service activities should be 
abolished, calling for establishing a truly democratic, 
united, free and happy new China. The committee also 
mobilized women, college faculties and students to 
oppose civil war and call for peace and democracy.
On the military side, the CPC adopted a hard-line 
policy of “giving tit for tat and fighting for every inch 
of land”. On the August 11, Mr. Zhu De, in his capacity 
as Commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Group Army 
and in the name of the Yan’an headquarters, issued seven 
consecutive orders to the troops in the liberated areas. The 
CPC army was asked to deliver an ultimatum to Japanese 
army and its puppet armies and regimes in nearby towns 
and important traffic lines, demanding them to “surrender 
all their weapons” and “accept their deployments” within 
a deadline, and “if they refuse to surrender or disarm, to 
destroy them” and “appoint commissioners to administer 
the administrative affairs of each region.” (State Archives 
Administration, 1991, p.217)
“Chiang Kai-shek used his legitimacy to accept the 
surrender of enemy forces, and the enemy could only 
hand over major cities and traffic lines to Chiang Kai-
shek. Under such circumstances, our army should change 
strategies. With an exception to a few locations that can 
still be occupied, generally we should threaten big cities 
and major roads with considerable forces to round up 
the enemy in big cities and major roads. However, we 
should make long-term plans by focusing our forces on 
the capture of small cities and rural areas to expand and 
consolidate the liberated areas, launching mass struggles, 
and training our troops to prepare for new situations. All 
regions should change their thinking and deployments 
gradually according to specific situations.” (State Archives 
Administration, 1991, p.243)
Up to now, the CPC had, in fact, abandoned the idea 
of seeking legal surrender-accepting and focusing its 
efforts on expanding the liberated areas as far as possible, 
either peacefully or by force, in order to gain a favorable 
position in the future domestic struggle.
During the surrender-accepting and reception process, 
the KMT and the CPC were at odds, sparking serious 
clashes and military confrontations in some areas. Due 
to the geographic proximity arising from the prolonged 
resistance in enemy’s rear areas and the operation to 
capture enemy-occupied counties that began in early 
1945, the CPC army had captured 94 of Hebei’s 132 
counties and completely controlled 82 counties by the 
early Japanese surrender. More than 90 percent of the 
towns in Shandong Province were captured. (Qin, 1945, 
p.318) Such a situation no longer allows the KMT to 
underestimate and the international community to ignore 
the CPC. At this point, the KMT had to choose between 
the CCP’s “peace policy” and the de facto “civil war 
policy”.
2. DETERMINATION OF THE CPC’S 
“PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND UNITY” 
POLICY
At the early victory of the anti-Japanese war, the KMT 
regime took the initiative and discourse power on both 
the political and military fronts, and had the tendency 
to impose a civil war on the CPC. In view of the serious 
political disadvantages in the country, the CPC were not 
given the time and opportunity to fully mobilize the entire 
party and the people of the country and to implement 
without difficulty the basic policy of establishing a new 
democratic state system of “independence, freedom, 
democracy, unity, and prosperity”, as set out in the 
CPC’s Seventh National Congress. Therefore, the slogan 
of “abolishing the KMT one-party dictatorship and 
establishing a democratic coalition government” (The 
Documentation Research Office of the CPC Central 
Committee, 1993, p.593) was obviously not adapted 
to the political situation at that time. On the premise of 
resolutely implementing the established basic policies set 
out in the Seventh National Congress, and in response 
to the trend of opposing civil war and calling for peace 
at home and abroad, it is necessary to formulate a policy 
that could gain the domestic general masses’ support, 
especially the democratic political forces, and achieve 
legitimacy through negotiations, so as to prevent the 
situation from sliding into the “first possible coalition 
government quagmire, or failure in the civil war launched 
by the KMT.”  (p.308)
At the second meeting of the First Plenary Session 
of the CPC’s Seventh Central Committee on August 
9, Mao Zedong defined four basic policies which were 
“cooperating in military operations, stopping a civil war, 
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centralized unification, and negotiation between the CPC 
and the KMT” after making an objective analysis of the 
current situation. On August 11, the above spirit was 
conveyed to the whole party. On August 13, Mao Zedong 
delivered a public speech in Yan’an, exposing the KMT’s 
conspiracy to start a civil war and clarifying to the people 
at home and abroad the CPC’s solemn position that it 
“resolutely opposes a civil war, does not approve of a civil 
war and wants to stop it”, will “lead the people to stop a 
civil war with great efforts and patience”, and “is ready to 
continue the KMT-CPC negotiations” on the basis of the 
Soviet-US-China agreement. (pp.617-618) 
At the moment, the KMT authorities were playing 
a “two-handed policy” in response to the CPC’s 
appeal for peace. On one hand, the KMT authorities 
politically deployed reception plans painstakingly, issued 
appointments and took control of large and medium-sized 
cities. Militarily, the KMT authorities continued to snatch 
large numbers of KMT troops from the rear to central, 
northern and northeastern China with the help of U.S. 
forces, seizing strategic locations in preparation for a civil 
war. Diplomatically, the KMT authorities were eager to 
sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 
and its subsidiary agreements as a bargaining chip in 
exchange for the Soviet Union’s approval of the KMT’s 
handling of the CPC issue, as long as “the CPC’s military 
orders and political decrees are fully vested in the Central 
Government, that is, following the practice of all other 
countries that the state laws should be observed effectively 
by every political party, then the government will treat 
the party equally. Once the government is reorganized 
upon the convening of a formal congress, the party may 
be accommodated within the Executive Council, but 
the government must not be called a coalition.” In other 
words, the KMT was in exchange for an assurance that 
the Soviet Union would “give all moral and material aid 
to the central government only, and that all aids from 
the Soviet government to China would be limited to the 
central government.” (Chin, 1981, pp.594 & 611)
On the other hand, at the instigation of Wu Dingchang, 
a core member of the Political Science Department, the 
KMT hastily raised the banner of “peace” in an attempt 
to enhance its political voice.    Chiang Kai-shek invited 
Mao Zedong to Chongqing three times on August 14, 20 
and 23 to discuss the state affairs and “formulate a general 
plan”2. He published the message in major newspapers, 
appearing with a sincere and impatient face, in order to 
stand in the vantage point of taking the initiative and 
pursuing peaceful reunification. His aim was to buy time 
to prepare for war, and to force the CPC to accept the 
high-handed situation, so as to achieve his purpose of 
politically settling the unification of political decrees and 
military orders, or to justifiably attack the liberated areas 
2 The Archives of President Chiang Kai-shek - A Sketch of Events 
(62), p.273.
on the pretext that the negotiations had broken down and 
the CPC was to be blamed. At one point, people of all 
stripes, both international and domestic, such as Stalin, 
Weidemeyer, Hu Shih, and Zhang Gan, called Yan’an and 
asked Mao Zedong to go to Chongqing to negotiate with 
Chiang Kai-shek.
In response to Chiang Kai-shek’s first open letter 
inviting Mao Zedong to Chongqing for negotiations, the 
CPC Central Committee publicly stated six demands 
on August 16, including two preconditions such as “in 
accepting the surrender of Japanese and its puppet armies 
and concluding all agreements and treaties after the 
surrender, the KMT must first consult with the CPC and 
reach agreements with us”, “abolish one-party dictatorship 
immediately, convene a meeting of all parties, establish 
a democratic coalition government, and recognize the 
legitimacy of the border regimes in the liberated areas and 
of the CPC Army” (Liberation Daily, 1945, pp. 211-213.). 
The Committee also stated that, only after Chiang Kai-
shek voiced his comments on those demands, would Mao 
Zedong “consider a meeting with you”, in order to guide 
domestic and foreign public opinion on Chiang Kai-shek’s 
invitation to peace talks.
In response to Chiang Kai-shek’s second open letter 
inviting Mao Zedong to Chongqing to negotiate, the 
CPC Central Committee decided that Zhou Enlai would 
go to Chongqing to restart the negotiations and prepare 
to present to the KMT government the Fourteen Present 
Urgent Demands on August 22, including “recognizing the 
democratically elected government and the anti-Japanese 
army in the liberated areas”, “releasing patriotic political 
prisoners”, “recognizing the legal status of all parties”, 
“convening a political meeting of representatives from all 
parties and independents immediately to discuss urgent 
measures for the end of the anti-Japanese war”, ceasing 
political tutelage, establishing a democratic coalition 
Government and preparing for a national assembly with 
free and universal suffrage. It shows that the CPC, on 
the basis of its peace policy, articulated more clearly and 
systematically the idea of a coalition government and the 
means to achieve it. 
 On the same day, Stalin called, advising that “China 
cannot fight a civil war, otherwise the Chinese nation is 
in danger of being destroyed, and Mao Zedong should 
go to Chongqing for peace talks.” (The Documentation 
Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, 1998, 
pp.629-630) On the following day, the CPC Central 
Committee convened an enlarged meeting of the 
Political Bureau and conducted an objective analysis and 
discussion of the international and domestic political 
situations. On the meeting, it was decided to amend the 
Fourteen Present Urgent Demands into six items, which 
were to be implemented as the CPC’s current basic tasks 
and policies. The meeting made a preliminary decision 
to send Mao Zedong to Chongqing to participate in the 
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negotiations, and with this decision in mind, various 
motions such as the work of the main leaders of the 
Central Committee and the adjustment of the struggle 
strategy during the period were deployed. 
On August 25, the Political Bureau and Secretariat 
of the CPC Central Committee formally made the 
important decision for Mao Zedong to represent the CPC 
Central Committee in Chongqing for negotiations. The 
aforementioned “Six Present Urgent Demands “ were 
immediately published in the form of the “Declaration of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on the Current Situation”, which formally proposed the 
policy of “peace, democracy and unity”, systematically 
and completely expressing the CPC’s solemn position, 
political ideas and approach to resolve the disputes 
between the KMT and the CPC in political ways and to 
seek peace, democracy and unity in the post-war China. 
The CPC defined the “Six Present Urgent Demands” 
as the basis for the CPC’s policy in the Chongqing 
negotiations. On the following day, the Political Bureau 
continued to discuss and refine its negotiating strategies, 
deciding to make necessary concessions in terms of 
territory, the number of PLA forces and currency in the 
liberated areas. The Bureau was of the view that, “without 
such concessions, we will not be able to break the KMT’s 
civil war conspiracy, gain political initiative, win the 
sympathy of international public opinion and the centrists 
at home, or obtain in return our Party’s legitimate status 
and a peaceful situation”, “under internal and external 
pressure, it is possible that after negotiations, the (KMT) 
will conditionally recognize the status of our party and our 
party will conditionally recognize the status of the KMT, 
resulting in a new phase of cooperation between the two 
parties (plus the Democratic League, etc.) and peaceful 
development.” However, while making concessions, the 
Bureau insisted on not harming fundamental interests, and 
asked the troops, regarding some important transportation 
routes, to “control all that can be controlled even if it is 
temporary, while at the same time occupying as many 
rural areas and small towns as possible with necessary 
forces” under the strategy of “I will oppose Chiang if 
he opposes me, and stop if Chiang stops in order to 
achieve unity through fighting in justifiable, beneficial 
and balanced ways.” (Mao, 1991, pp.1153-1154) The 
CPC committees in all regions were asked not to abandon 
their vigilance against Chiang Kai-shek because of the 
negotiations. 
Up to now, the CPC’s post-war policy for “peace, 
democracy and unity” and its implementation strategies 
were developed and deployed, winning a brief period of 
peace for the post-war China and a practical opportunity 
for China’s democracy process. As the CPC pushed 
forward its peace and democracy policy, the KMT would 
pay the price for its own stubborn positions, rigid policies 
and arrogant attitudes, becoming politically helpless and 
losing the initiative step by step. 
3. THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS: 
A CONFIRMATION OF THE DOMESTIC 
CONSENSUS ON “PEACE, DEMOCRACY 
AND UNITY”
On the afternoon of August 28, 1945, a delegation 
comprising Mr. Mao Zedong, Mr. Zhou Enlai, and Mr. 
Wang Ruofei, accompanied by Mr. Hurley and Mr. Zhang 
Zhizhong, flew from Yan’an to Chongqing. The KMT-
CPC negotiations lasted 43 days from October 29 until the 
signing of the October 10 Agreement by representatives of 
both parties on October 10. Depending on the issues and 
processes involved in the negotiations, it can be broadly 
divided into three stages: exchange of views, specific 
negotiations and signing of agreements. 
Stage one: exchange of views (August 29 to September 
3). During this stage, the leaders of both parties held 
meetings to establish the principles of negotiations; 
representatives from both parties exchanged views freely on 
the necessity, principles, guidelines, procedures and content 
of the negotiations. On the first day of the negotiations, 
Chiang Kai-shek began by claiming “there is no civil war 
in China” in an attempt to deny the legitimacy of the CPC 
army. Mao Zedong instantly refuted it by citing numerous 
facts from the ten-year civil war and the war against Japan: 
“it is a deception to say that there was no civil war in 
China.” (The Documentation Research Office of the CPC 
Central Committee, 1993, p.17) The KMT disagreed in 
their hearts and insisted that the attack on the CPC forces 
was a “bandit expedition” to the extent that, on August 29, 
September 17 and October 13, He Yingqin and Chiang Kai-
shek secretly ordered the various war zones to publish the 
“Bandit Expedition Manual” formulated by Chiang Kai-
shek in 1933 when he attacked the Red Army, and acted 
accordingly, but they verbally had to admit the concept of 
“civil war.” Chiang Kai-shek laid down three principles for 
the representatives of the KMT side in response to the six 
demands of the CPC’s Public Declaration on the Present 
State of Affairs. This set the tone for the negotiations that 
the KMT side wanted and their outcome. 
On August 30, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai drafted 
and intended to submit eleven proposals for the 
Chongqing Negotiations to the KMT side at an appropriate 
time, stating the CPC’s position and the direction of the 
negotiations in order to test the KMT side’s attitude and 
obtain a counterproposal from KMT early. 
On September 2, Mao Zedong, relying on the above 
eleven proposals, verbally informed Wang Shijie of the 
CPC’s negotiation principles with regard to eight basic 
issues, including political conference, national assembly, 
freedom, political parties, release of political prisoners, 
administration of the liberated areas, the CPC army, and 
surrender-accepting.
On September 3, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, the CPC 
representatives, formally presented the above eight basic 
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issues and eleven proposals to the KMT representatives. On 
the next day, Chiang Kai-shek gave his four “Key Points 
for Negotiation with the CPC” to the KMT representatives. 
Chiang Kai-shek had other plans; but as long as he put the 
party political conference on the negotiation agenda, even 
the best-laid plans would not help.
Stage two: concrete negotiations (September 4 to 
October 5). During this stage, representatives from 
both parties negotiated on specific issues under the 
framework of Chiang Kai-shek’s “Three Principles” 
and “Four Points” mentioned above and Mao Zedong’s 
“Eight Principles” and on the basis of the CPC’s “Eleven 
Principles.” Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei held 12 
difficult negotiations with Zhang Qun, Shao Lizi, Zhang 
Zhizhong, Zhang Licang, Ye Chusheng and other KMT 
representatives as well as some democratic figures at No. 
101 and 103 Deanli on Zhongshan Fourth Road and the 
National Council location within 32 days. However, due 
to the KMT’s insistence on not recognizing the liberated 
areas and its regime, and its insistence that the CPC army 
could only be organized into 12 divisions, the two parties 
ultimately failed to reach an agreement on the army and 
the liberated areas.
Stage three: conclusion and signing of the agreement 
(October 6 to October 10). Through the Chongqing 
Negotiations, both parties reach an agreement on the 
peaceful nation-founding guideline, political consultative 
conference, national assembly (postponed, with the 
existing deputies valid but requiring additional quotas), 
party legitimacy and political democratization, army 
nationalization, equal party cooperation and other issues. 
All these efforts together pushed and determined the 
inevitable signature by both the KMT and CPC on this 
unsatisfactory negotiation outcome. On October 10, 
Wang Shijie, Zhang Qun, Zhang Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, 
Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei on behalf of both parties 
signed in turn on the the text of the Minutes of Talks 
between the KMT and CPC Representatives (also known 
as the “October 10 Agreement”) drafted by Zhou Enlai, 
in the Guiyuan guest room at No. 107 Zhongshan Fourth 
Road. The next day, MAO Zedong and Wang Ruofei, 
accompanied by Zhang Zhizhong, flew back to Yan ‘an.
In order to cooperate with the Chongqing Negotiations, 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai seized every spare moment 
to visit people from all factions of the KMT, the middle 
class, centrists, cultural, educational, scientific and 
technological circles and friends, political councilors in 
Chongqing, representatives of foreign missions in China 
and private citizens, and even ordinary soldiers of the 
U.S. Army, to explain the CPC’s peace, democracy and 
unity policy, to listen to their opinions and suggestions, 
and to strive for their understanding and support. All 
this work and its achievements made it possible for the 
CPC’s policy ideas to begin to spread and win the hearts 
and minds of the people in the KMT ruling areas. This 
exerted tremendous pressure on the KMT authorities 
and contributing to a large extent to the success of the 
Chongqing Negotiations.
CONCLUSION
In the Chongqing Negotiations, by forcing the KMT to 
state that it would “cooperate with the CPC for a long 
period of time and resolutely avoid a civil war”, the CPC 
had the KMT acknowledge the peace and democracy 
policy. By forcing the KMT to accept the concept of “civil 
war”, it made the KMT difficult to establish its legitimate 
rule and enabled the CPC to achieve its key objective of 
avoiding immediate outbreak of a civil war and avoiding 
its political passivity and illegitimacy. In addition, the 
postponement of the national assembly created a tendency 
for the KMT to change from being politically active to 
being politically passive. While the failure to reach an 
agreement on the CPC army and the liberated areas might 
appear to be a failure on the part of the CPC and a failure 
to achieve its fundamental purpose of the negotiations, 
on the contrary, it kept the status quo intact, leaving the 
CPC army and the liberated areas intact. In fact, it proved 
that the CPC’s party conference program was workable, 
recognized the new procedural model for achieving 
democracy in China that Mao Zedong proposed a year 
earlier after a tortuous process, and validated the basic 
approach to a coalition government strategy. From long-
term vision and the perspective of regime legitimacy, this 
was the biggest gain the CPC made in the Chongqing 
Negotiations, which revitalized its democratic quest and 
united front work in its entirety, thus radically reversing 
its political disadvantage. Thus, from the postwar political 
and strategic situations of the KMT and the CPC, the 
Chongqing Negotiations ended up with a total defeat for 
Chiang Kai-shek and a total victory for the CPC.
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